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Avail and 1 or 
Special 
This paper discusses to megali idea, or the "Great Idea," which is at the 
origin of modern Greek nationalism. The "Idea" was to regain lands which 
formerly belonged to the Greek empire. The current Greek government's 
official line disavows any expansionist views, but the "Idea" has never really 
died. In amplification of this Idea and its ramifications, the origin and character 
of Greek nationalism are examined, especially as they pertain to the formation 
of Greek foreign policy. The problems of minorities within Greece, the Greek 
diaspora and the influence of the Greek Orthodox Church on foreign policy 
issues are also analyzed. The findings aid in a greater understanding of Greek 
foreign policy both in today's Balkan crisis and in Greece's ongoing conflict 
with Turkey, as well as illuminating the potential for Greece's involvement in 
future Balkan crises. 
Many of the conclusions presented in this paper were based on primary 
language research and interviews throughout mainland Greece and eighteen of 
the major islands, from September through November 1993. National elections 
which brought to power a socialist Prime Minister were held during October 
1993, amid much rhetoric and international debate over questions of an 
"independent" Macedonia and minorities in Northern Epirus. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
TO MEGALIIOEA--DEAD OR ALIVE?: 
The Domestic Determinants of Greek Foreign Policy 
L T Mary A. Jenkins 
March 1994 
The Greeks are critically important players in the Balkan arena, and the 
future for Greece looks very difficult. The opportunities offered by European 
Union (EU) membership have not been fully exploited, and the Greek financial 
picture is less than ideal. Greece is a member of the key institutions of 
European security, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU, 
yet is a major participant in the Balkan crisis which threatens to turn into a third 
Balkan war. An understanding of the domestic context of Greece goes a long 
way toward revealing the potential for future Balkan crises. 
The premise of this paper is that the Mfy6Aql6ta, or "Great Idea," which 
is at the origin of modern Greek nationalism, is still alive in the hearts and 
minds of modern Greeks. The "Idea" was to regain lands which formerly 
belonged to the Greek empire. The current Greek government's official line 
disavows any expansionist views, and has done so since the early 1950's. 
The "Idea," however, is not really dead. The Great Idea lives in the Greek 
subconscious. It is not perpetuated through malice or nationalistic ambition 
alone, but also through a consuming passion to keep alive the glory of ancient 
vi 
.. 
Greece, which the modern Greek jealously protects as his birthright. So, if 
community discipline within NATO erodes, there is the chance that Greece will 
elect independent action--even in the face of international disapproval. 
The twin issues of minorities within Greece and the Greek diaspora have 
run as consistently and as pervasively throughout Greek history as they do 
throughout today's newspaper headlines. One of the most important reasons 
for the persistent prominence of the dispute over minorities is the importance 
of the Greek Orthodox Church in the hearts, minds and history of the Greek 
people. The popular mood and potential for conflict is as readily observed in 
the Greek reaction to today' s Macedon ian and Northern Epirus questions as in 
official actions of the church and government centuries ago. 
On every side, as seen from Athens, there are problems. To the north is 
a rapidly spreading crisis in the Balkans, poor relations with Albania over illegal 
immigration and the Vorio Epirus question, and the conflict over Macedonia. 
To the east and north·east lie the always antagonistic interests of Turkey, and 
the unpredictable pattern of development of the ex·Communist states. Further 
south lies Cyprus, and the possibility of some future crisis on the troubled 
island which still has not seen a satisfactory conclusion to its central dilemma. 
From the west come questions of Greece's role in the New Europe with its 
single market and Maastricht commitments. 
The 1990's for Greece are likely to mean a rediscovery of itself as a 
Balkan country and a greater distancing from external influences, especially 
vi 
under the newly-elected Prime Minister. Throughout his 1993 campaign, as i11 
his previous campaigns, he compared Greece to the underdeveloped third-world 
countries, claiming that Greece has more in common with them than with the 
Western states. This thinking is bound to exert a significant influence on 
Greece's interaction with the rest of the world. 
Certainly, the Greeks will not develop any love for the Turks. They have 
hated them for so long that the response is nearly Pavlovian in Greece. Yet 
Turkey, it seems, has moved beyond the ancient enmities. Turkey may posture 
and maneuver in ways which irritate Greece, but losing a fight at the cost of 
loss of pride would not devastate the Turks as it would the Greeks. The Greek 
rivalry, a Turk might explain, is a thing of the past. The Greeks have 
internalized and institutionalized their malice in a way that their enemy has not. 
Mr. Papandreau has every reason to expect that his constituency would 
support him in any steps he takes toward expansion in the name of the Great 
Idea, of self-defense, or even of preventive aggression. The Greeks pride 
themselves on being clever and on being able to recognize as well as capitalize 
on an opportunity. If Albania becomes more of a problem, or Skopje evapo-
rates--or worse, solidifies--and the international community does not rally 
behind Greece as Greece feels it is their responsibility to do, it is quite possible 
that the Greeks will feel the need to act on latent nationalistic ideals. The 
Greeks would view this not as aggression, but as a move made toward justice 
or self-defense--and toward the all-encompassing end of self-preservation. 
vi 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Greeks are critically important players in the Balkan arena. Greece is 
a member of the key institutions of European security, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU--formerly the European 
Community), and is a major participant in the Balkan crisis which threatens to 
turn into a third Balkan war. It is vital that the international community gains 
at least a rudimentary understanding of the domestic context of this ancient 
fledgling--ancient in historical outlook and significance, yet politically neophytic-
-in order to precipitate and understand the potential for future Balkan crises. 
The premise of this paper is that the MEy6Aql6ia, or "Great Idea," which 
is at the origin of modern Greek nationalism, is still alive and well in the hearts 
and minds of modern Greeks. The "Idea" was to regain lands which formerly 
belonged to the Greek empire. The current Greek government's official line 
disavows any of these expansionist views, and has done so continually since 
the early 1950's. This study will show that the "Idea" is not really dead. So, 
as community discipline within NATO erodes, there is indeed the chance that 
Greece will elect independent action--even in the face of international 
disapproval. 
1 
As the importance of the domestic political roots of foreign policy is 
becoming increasingly evident, study of those roots has become one of the 
most readily accepted ways of acquiring insights into underlying motivations 
of states. It is increasingly true that, "the consciousness of the interdepen-
dance of national and international life [is] pervasive. " 1 
Domestically, Greece is in a state of flux. Having elected to power a 
socialist Prime Minister, the aging Andreas Papandreau, as recently as 10 
October 1993, it is difficult to predict with certainty the direction domestic 
politics will take. But it is possible that Mr. Papandreau's rhetoric will not 
espouse increasing Greece's level of international cooperation any more than 
it did in 1981, when he was last elected to power. Fortunately for the 
international community, his rhetoric, at that time, did not consistently match 
his deeds (as when "Our Andreas" was elected on a platform which included 
ejection of the United States military from Greece, followed by his signature on 
further base agreements with the United States). This is likely to be the case 
again, especially after Greece assumes the European Union presidency in 
January 1994. 
This paper discusses the twin issues of minorities within Greece and the 
Greek diaspora, issues which have run as consistently and as pervasively 
1James Rosenau, The Adaptation of National Societies: A Theory of 
Political System Transformation (New York: McCaleb-Seiler Publishers, 1970), 
p. 1. 
2 
throughout Greek history as they do throughout today' s newspaper headlines. 
One of the most integral reasons for the persistent prominence of the dispute 
over minorities is the importance of the Greek Orthodox Church in the hearts, 
minds and history of the Greek people. The often-ir.stitutionalized problems of 
ethnic or religious Greek minorities and minorities in Greece will be presented, 
especially in terms of their effects on the formation of Greek foreign policy 
during this century. The popular mood and potential for conflict is as readily 
observed in the Greek reaction to today's Macedonian and Northern Epirus 
questions as in official actions of the church and government centuries ago. 
These critical and deeply-rooted issues are analyzed for findings which help in 
understanding Greek foreign policy in the Balkan crisis and in the age-old and 
ongoing conflict with Turkey. 
The first step toward understanding how a people react to external stimuli, 
however, is understanding not only how they view personalities and events 
foreign to themselves, but also how they view themselves. In this area, study 
of the nationalism of a people is most instructive. A brief discussion of Greek 
nationalism is thus an appropriate introduction to the question of how Greece's 
domestic environment affects its foreign policy. 
3 
II. THE CHARACTER OF GREEK NATIONALISM 
Nationalism is a political force which has been at least as important in 
shaping the history of Europe and the world over the last two centuries as the 
ideas of freedom and parliamentary democracy or of communism; arguably 
more so. The roots of modern nationalism are to be found in late eighteenth-
century Western Europe and North America--roots from which it grew 
prodigiously. According to German historian Friedrich Meinecke, socialism and 
nationalism were the two "main currents of thought of the nineteenth centu-
ry."2 
The definition of this pervasive force, however, is elusive. Is it emancipa-
tion or oppression 7 Is it a danger, a restriction on liberty, a threat to the very 
survival of a people, or is it the embodiment of hopes for a free and just social 
order, liberation from political and social dis,~rimination? There have been those 
who argued that nationalism as such does not even exist, only a multitude of 
manifestations of the idea of nationalism. 3 
For purposes of this study, a force which will be referred to as nationalism 
is assumed to exist. This force will be defined and manipulated, for purposes 
3See Peter Alter, Nationalism (New York: Edward Arnold, 1985), chapter 
1. 
4 
of this study, as that popular or individual sentiment which places the nation 
upon the highest pedestal, the nation's value residing in its capacity as a 
binding agency of meaning and justification. Nations, in this context, are the 
building blocks of humanity. When a time or situation calls for a declaration of 
loyalty, it is the nation to which an individual will be loyal. National interests, 
therefore, provide the yardsticks of political thought and action. 
The current hotbed of insecurity and potential explosion in the Balkans 
renders study of the nations in that area highly relevant and timely. While the 
contributions of the ancient Hellenes to civilization as a whole are well-
understood, how the future of Balkan politics will unfold, and what part Greece 
will play, is uncertain. Wherever the events of the coming years lead, it is 
certain that Greek nationalism is likely to play a significant part. Although 
Greece is often viewed as a land of individuals who are prone to, and thrive on, 
diversity and dissention, the Greeks can conjure a devotional intensity rarely 
rivalled when their sacred lands or history are endangered, as they have done 
in support of what they view as their sovereign right over the word, "Macedo-
nia," for example. 
What follows is a discussion of the character of modern Greek nationalism 
as shaped by history--ethnicity, religion and foreign influences--and by modern-
day concerns, as introductory background material on which to build the true 
concern of this paper. 
5 
A. TOWARD A TYPOLOGY 
Peter Alter has suggested that there exist two main groups or basic types 
of nationalism--risorgimento and integral. 4 He defines the first of these as: 
... an emancipatory political force that accompanies the liberation both of 
new social strata within an existing, formerly absolutest western 
European state, and of a people that has grown conscious of itself in 
opposition to a transnational ruling power in east-central Europe. The 
ultimate goal of Risorgimento nationalism .•• is liberation from political and 
social oppression. 5 
Integral nationalism, Alter continues, stands 
... In complete contrast to Risorgimento nationalism, which proceeds from 
the notion that all nationalisms and the claims of all national movements 
are equal, integral nationalism defines the one nation as the Abso-
lute ••• The nation that proves itself as the strongest and fittest in a hostile 
and competing world shall gain the upper hand and ultimately survive. 8 
If one accepts the existence of these two typologies of nationalism, it 
appears that the nationalism most representative of the Greeks is of the 
Risorgimento sort. Yet, the influence of integral nationalism certainly cannot 
be dismissed. In officially denying the existence of "lesser" minorities within 
Greece and in keeping alive a spirit which espouses Greece's right and duty to 
take for itself all that is available, territorially or morally, the Greek state 
personifies integral nationalism. Certainly, supreme love of the homeland and 
belief in its superiority over all others must be the basis for ideas of "enosis" 
4For a complete discussion and case studies on the main types of 
nationalism, see Alter, op. cit. 
5Aiter, op. cit., pp. 28-29. 
8Aiter, op. cit., p. 38. 
8 
(lvwu1~--reunification of Greece with Cyprus) and the "megali idea" (To MEytiA17 
161a--the Greek version of "manifest destiny" or "mission civilitrize"). 
Still, the Greek people always seem to be fighting for "a just cause," and 
wanting only to redeem that which has gone astray, or regain what they have 
lost and feel they rightfully deserve. Greek nationalism has fueled, "a protest 
movement against an existing system of political domination, against a state 
which destroys the nation's traditions and prevents it flourishing, "7 using as 
justification the right of every nation, and of each member of a nation, to 
autonomous development. In the collective Greek mind, individual freedom and 
national independence are closely connected. Thus, the declaration issued 
before the Greek National Assembly on 27 January 1822 (a declaration which 
would be written into the Greek Constitution) read: 
This war ••• is not aimed at the advantage of any single part of the Greek 
people; it is a national war, a holy war, a war the object of which is to 
reconquer ••• the rights which the civilized people of Europe, our neighbou-
rs, enjoy today; rights of which the cruel and unheard of tyranny of the 
Ottomans would deprive us--us alone--and the very memory of which they 
would stifle in our hearts. 8 
The Greeks continually believe themselves persecuted by nearly everyone, 
especially their arch-rival, Turkey. In a Greek journal which presents a self-
proclaimed "rounded and enlightening report touching upon the distinctive 
7Aiter, op. cit., p. 29. 
8Printed in Hans Kohn, ed •• Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, 2nd 
edition (Princeton, NJ: 1965), pp. 116-7. 
7 
characteristics of a country which is often the source of tension in its region," 
it is evident that the Greek view of Turkey is one of the "'spoiled child' of the 
West. "1 The journal, which pictures on its cover a symbolically Turkish 
hammer and sickle on top of an American flag, rumpled on the ground, 
continues with, "Turkish propaganda has been trying, yet again, and · "3 
manner lacking in any finesse, to distort reality by adjusting it to its apJI J 
and plans for expansion, at the same time completely ignoring any concept of 
law. n10 
The Greek fixation on a negative relationship with Turkey is highly evident 
in official communications. For instance, in a September 1993 speech 
delivered in Monterey, California, to Greek and American graduate students by 
Mr. Elias Clis, the Greek Consul General in San Francisco since 1992, the 
emphasis on matters Turkish is so profound that in a one-hour lecture on 
"Greece and the Balkan Crisis," twenty minutes were devoted to Turkey. 
These twenty minutes were filled with phrases such as, "Muslim steamroller," 
"Islamization of society," "[Turkish] problem of identity with Europe," "[Turkish] 
desire for position of preponderance, .. and .. militant lslamism. n 
Interestingly, when the speech turned at last to the concerns of other 
Balkan states, such as Bosnia, Mr. Clis claimed that Greece maintained, " ... as 
1
"The Turkish Factor in View of New Circumstances," Athena--Monthly 
Review of lntemational Affairs, volume 49 (September 1991 ), p. 265. 
10
"Turkey Stirs Up More Trouble," Athena, p. 273. 
a 
much sympathy for Muslims as Serbs ... ," warned against "selective outrage," 
and made recurring comparisons to the Cyprus dilemma. In citing historical 
identification with Serbia, Mr. Clis apologized for Milosevic, but warned that 
there would be no peace without "equilibrium." 
B. THE ORIGINS OF MODERN GREEK NATIONALISM 
1 • Historical Basis 
Although modern Greek nationalism is a derivative of the emergence 
of Greece as an independent nation-state in the early nineteenth century, its 
origins go back further in history. It is related to the rise of nationalism and of 
nation-states in seventeenth-century Western Europe and was affected by the 
interaction of European and Ottoman international politics. 11 It was reflexive 
in character, a symptom of four hundred years of Turkish occupation followed 
by the expansion of a new ideology. 
As early as the late thirteenth century, Greek literature holds 
statements such as that which was addressed to the Emperor Manual II 
Palaeologus (1350-1425) by George Gemistus: "We, over whom you rule, are 
11Stephen G. Xydis, "Modern Greek Nationalism," Nationalism in Eastern 
Europe, Peter F. Sugar and lvo J. Lederer, eds. (Seattle, WA: University of 
Washington Press, 1971), p. 207. 
9 
Hellenes by race, as evinced by our language and ancestral education. "12 If 
belief in a common descent, regardless of whether an objective blood 
relationship exists or not, may be one of the characteristics of an ethnic 
group, 13 then it is justifiable to discern in the thought of Gemistus an early 
sign of Greek nationalism. 
E8voris the contemporary Greek word for "nation." When the initial 
"e' is pridefully capitalized, this word stands for the nation par excellence, the 
Greek nation. At the time of the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, 
however, literary sources indicate that this word was seldom used. Another 
word, ylvor, was most popular in discussion of the nation at that time. rlvor 
is most precisely defined as "race," "stock," "offspring," "kin" or "origin, "14 
revealing the deepening historical consciousness and pride of the Greeks of 
those times in their ancestors, whom they believed to be the ancient 
Greeks. 11 A neoclassicism of sorts is evidenced in the early nineteenth 
12S. Lambros, Palaeologan and Peloponnesian Matters, volume 3 (Cam-
bridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 246. 
13For a discussion of the bases of social groups, the unit of nationalism, see 
Max Weber, "Types of Social Organization, • T. Parsons, E. Shils, D. Naegele 
and J. R. Pitts, ads., Theories of Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1965). 
14G. C. Divry and C. G. Divry, eds., Divry's New English-Greek and Greek-
English Handy Dictionary (New York: D.C. Divry, Inc., 1964), p. 296. 
111n ancient Greek, the word "18vor" means a number of people living 
together, a nation, a tribe, even a trading association. Only six additional 
entries in Uddell and Scott's ancient Greek dictionary are connected with this 
noun either as adjectives or as composite nouns. In modem dictionaries, 
however, there are not only the above definitions but also fifteen or more 
10 
century in the practice of renaming even common village children after the 
great figures of Greek lore. Commenting on the subject of name-changing at 
that time, Ali Pasa, the Lion of loannina, observed: "You Greeks have 
something big in your minds. You no longer christen your children 'r Kfvvqr 
(John),' 11lTPOS" (Peter)' or 'KwvUTaVTfvor (Constantinos) I, but I I\Ewvf6ar 
(Leonidas),' '8EJJIUToKAt1r (Themistocles),' 'ApiUTI6t1r (Aristides).' What are you 
cooking up now7"18 
The Greek language, as any other, tended to establish a discrete 
communications circuit which contributed to the cohesion of the people--both 
elite and masses--who spoke it, and contributed to their corresponding sense 
of separateness from those who did not. Within the Ottoman Empire, the 
Greek-speaking element or subpopulation constituted a broad, loose network 
that extended beyond the empire's confines to the Greeks of the diaspora, who 
had fled to the West with Constantinople's fall or who settled there later as 
traders. 17 
additional entries connected with this noun, such as £8VIKIUJJ6r (nationalism), 
EBVIKO"ollil (nationalize), £8VIKT6vor (ethnocidal or genocidal). This tends to 
indicate that Greek ethnocentrism is a modern, not an ancient, phenomenon. 
18K. T. Dimaras, The H1"story of Modern Greek Literature (Athens, 1947), p. 
164. 
170. J. Gianakopoulos, Greek Scholars in Venice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1962), pp. 280-281. 
11 
2. Baals in Religion 
A more extensive but less homogeneous bond within the Ottoman 
Empire lay in common religious values, those of Eastern or Greek Orthodoxy. 
This circuit, though looser than that of the language because of greater 
numbers, and less cohesive because of the inability to communicate easily via 
a common system of codification, was organized and institutionalized with a 
Greek-speaking Patriarchate, situated in Constantinople, at its head. Its 
hierarchy tended to regard itself as the guardian of the Greek Orthodox flock 
against encroachments by both Ottoman Turks and Latins. Various restrictions 
on the performance of religious duties as well as the imposition of a head tax 
contributed to the maintenance of a separateness of the "people of the book 
(Bible) • from the Muslims. 
One of the most obvious links between Orthodoxy and the Greek 
state may be found in the period of Ottoman occupation. When Mehmed II 
conquered Constantinople in 1453, he brought an end to the secular power of 
the Greek Empire, but he allowed ecclesiastical authority to take its place. As 
Islamic law divided peoples according to religion, not nationality, the Greek 
subjects of the Sultan were put into a millet, a nation, with the Patriarch at its 
head. Thus was forged the bond between the official Greek religion and the 
official Greek state. The Church and its Greek population generally enjoyed 
security and toleration, as long as they accepted Ottoman sovereignty. In 
return for the privileges it enjoyed, the Church hierarchy had to accept 
12 
incorporation into the administration of the Turkish state. When that 
bureaucracy became subject to increasing corruption after Suleiman' s reign, the 
Greek church shared in the decline. 
The early seventeenth-century Greek was imbued with a spirit that 
recognized the new superiority of the West but found solace in the thought of 
the "glory that was Greece." Greek writers of the diaspora, or those living in 
territories that had escaped Ottoman conquest, directed their thoughts to the 
fate of their correligionists who had come under the rule of Islam. In the 
process they produced stereotypes concerning national character. Yet, it was 
the idea of Christian against Muslim, rather than Greek against Turk, which 
maintained the wall of separation between conqueror and conquered, and gave 
rise to compositions of indignant lament. Frangiskos Skoufos, a Roman 
Catholic propagandist born in Crete in 1644, composed a prayer calling upon 
"Christ, liberator of all the world," eventually to liberate the ylvof, from the 
slavery of the Hagarenes. "Until when," the prayer exclaims, "shall a ylvo~ as 
glorious and noble have to prostrate itself before the godless turban?"18 Elias 
Miniatis (1669-1714), who lived in Venice-held Greece, addressed a similar 
prayer to the Virgin Mary: "Until when, oh Immaculate Virgin, shall the thrice-
miserable ylvo~ of the Greeks remain in shackles of incredible slavery?"18 
18Modern Greek Literature, pp. 100-101. 
11/b/d., p. 114. 
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This nurturing of the hope for freedom from Muslim domination went hand in 
hand with Catholic propaganda and stimulated a sense of continuity between 
pre-Christian and post-Byzantine Hellenism, spreading faith in the descent from 
ancient Greeks among the people of the enslaved ytvof. 
The majority of Greek revolutionaries who took up arms against 
Turkish rule in 1821 were closely linked to Orthodoxy and devoted to its 
traditions. They believed they were fighting as much for their Christian faith 
as for political freedom, and regarded the struggle to drive out the Turks as a 
holy war against Islam. So When the 1821 revolution broke out in the 
Peloponnesus and Alexander lpsilantis invaded the Principalities in the name of 
freedom for the Christian Balkan peoples, the Greek church was forced to 
respond. In Constantinople, the Patriarch officially disavowed the action and 
excommunicated its supporters, fearing the consequences of an uprising whose 
success was extremely doubtful. Nevertheless, the Patriarch and several of his 
bishops, as well as Orthodox officials and local Christian prelates throughout 
the Ottoman world, fell to Turkish vengeance. 
The reaction of the religious leaders outside of Constantinople, 
however, was often quite different from that officially expressed by the Church. 
Many village priests, being natural leaders in their communities, enthusiastically 
joined the armies which sought the expulsion of the Turks. 
In December 1821, a constitution containing, as its very first article, 
a statement that the Orthodox Church was the established religion of the Greek 
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state, was produced. It also formed a Ministry of Religion. However, the 
forces of secular nationalism were already at work in that the assembly 
divested the bishops of the judicial authority which they enjoyed under 
Ottoman regime. 20 
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the boundaries of the 
Church had been expanded along with those of the state. In 1881, Thessaly 
and a part of Epirus were turned over to Greece as a result of the Russo-Turkish 
war, and the Holy Synod of Athens took over the administration of the 
churches there. Apostolos Makrakis, a man with intense devotion to 
Orthodoxy, chose this moment of expanding influence to begin a personal 
crusade to improve the religious life of the Greek people. He founded a school 
to propagate his principles and attacked the Church from within. He exposed 
three bishops as having received their appointment due to bribes in 1875, and 
was forced into exile by the Church in retaliation. His school was closed by 
Church officials. 
The early twentieth century was marked by a number of significant 
events for the religious life of the country. Perhaps most notable was the 
arrival of Eleftherios Venizelos on the scene in 1910. His activities would 
eventually split the clergy of Greece as they did the nation into those who 
20Charles Frazee, "Church and State in Greece," John T. A. Koumoulides, 
ed., Greece in Transition (london: Zeno Booksellers and Publishers, 1977), pp. 
129-30. 
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supported and those.Jtvho opposed him. Most prominent churchmen sided with 
the King in the conflict between Venizelos and King Constantine over Greek 
participation in World War I, and a public ceremony of excommunication took 
place in Athens, led by Archbishop Theoklitos, who declared, "Cursed be 
Eleftherios Venizelos who puts priests into prison and rises up against his King 
and his nation. " 21 
In December 1923, the same month the Holy Synod adopted the 
new Gregorian calendar for Greece, Archbishop Chrystomos called for broader 
reforms in a letter to the Minister of Religion. He demanded that the present 
Holy Synod be abolished and the government free the Church from its 
dependence on the state. Before the end of the year, a new constitution was 
established for the Church. In the future, the power of the civil government 
would be severely limited in interfering with church affairs. This new 
constitution, however, was repealed by the Generals in 1925 and a govern-
ment-led Synod was reestablished. 
More than just an outlet for the frustrations of the Greek soul, the 
Greek Orthodox Church played a significant part in the governing of an oft-
suppressed people. The Orthodox church is referred to in the Constitution as 
the "prevailing" or "established" religion of the country and thus gains certain 
privileges and obligations. Proselytization by other religious groups is forbidden 
21/b/d., p. 139. 
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under the Constitution, but the fundamental law neither expressly defines 
"proselytization" nor enforces this prohibition. The Church is dependent on the 
government for financial and legal support--the state pays the clergy, subsidizes 
the church budget, and administers its property. The government lends support 
through indirect taxes for church purposes, requires religious education at the 
primary and secondary levels, and also subsidizes higher religious education. 
In return, the church is supervised by the Ministry of National Education and 
Religion. The Government announced its official intention to separate church 
and state in 1981 , but, over a decade later, the implications still are not clear. 
Still, for centuries the village priest has been the preserver of Greek culture and 
religious traditions, and as such he has been generally respected by villagers. 
The Greek Orthodox Church is heir to a cultural tradition of vast 
antiquity and strength. It has inherited much of the psychology and the 
attitudes of the theocratic Byzantine world, down to one of the Patriarch's 
many titles, that of archbishop of the "New Rome." Yet, the central dilemma 
of Orthodoxy today is a result of geography--a pervasive theme in Greek 
history. Quite simply, the head of the Greek Church is not in Greece, and, 
according to Ottoman statutes still in force, the candidacy is limited to those 
of Turkish nationality. Although the Greek Orthodox church is culturally strong 
in Greece (to be "really" Greek is to be Orthodox), it is a church without a 
home in its own nation. Distressingly to its members, the pool of strong, 
intelligent, Greek, Turkish-born leaders from which the Patriarchs are drawn is 
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dwindling, due to the rise of secularism and the movement of Greeks out of 
Turkey in response to persistent persecution of that minority. "There is an 
unmistakable impression of a church and culture being slowly strangled by 
Turkish bureaucracy and cultural repression. " 22 
3. Ottoman Occupation 
When Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453, the 
Orthodox Greeks initially welcomed the Muslim Ottomans, finding them less 
offensive religiously than the Roman Catholics. However, the Ottoman 
occupation closed access to Europe and imposed strict isolation on Greece. For 
the next three hundred years, little of not happened while Greece settled into 
patterns of subjugation. 
As early as 1480, armed resistance to harsh Ottoman taxes arose in 
the mountainous areas. K/ephts, or bandits, attacked tax collectors and other 
Ottoman authorities in what Richard Clogg has called "a primitive form of 
national resistance. "23 Though indistinguishable from those of common 
bandits, their exploits were recorded in ballads and became a part of the 
carefully-preserved folklore, helping to inspire nationalist rebellion in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
22James Pettifer, "The Greeks" (london: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 114-5. 
23Cited in Rinn S. Shinn, Greece: A Country Study (Washington, DC: The 
American University, 1986), p. 16. 
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One of the most prominent groups of Greek-speaking elites within the 
Ottoman empire was the traders. By the end of the eighteenth century, for 
example, Thessaloniki-centered trade, which dominated the Balkans and 
extended to Venice, Germany, Austria, Poland, and Hungary was largely in 
Greek hands. 24 Thus, a commercial bourgeoisie was emerging and becoming 
an important factor in the growth of Greek nationalism. Its dissatisfaction with 
the Ottoman economic system tended to strengthen the sense of separateness 
that incited national consciousness and stimulated the formation of mutually 
negative attitudes and stereotypes. 
Other elite subgroups also came to the fore, including shipowners on 
the islands of the Aegean as well as landowners in the Peloponnese. Unequal 
systems of taxation and distribution of privileges and income naturally produced 
in the Greek element of the Ottoman empire widespread discontent with the 
inequity and injustice of fiscal and social policies toward the Greek-speaking 
peoples.25 
Despite centuries of Ottoman rule, a Greek "nation" survived, but it 
was difficult to define clearly. Because self-identified Greeks could be found 
around the globe, geographical definitions were inadequate. Although the 
24N. G. Svoronos, The Commerce of Salonika (Athens: 1954), pp. 354-
356. 
21M. Sakellariou, The Pe/oponnese During the Second Turkish Domination, 
1715-1821 (Athens: 1939), pp. 224-225. 
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Greek language had not been challenged, many of those who considered 
themselves Greek no longer spoke Greek, having adopted the language of their 
new homes. The Orthodox religion, therefore, became the principal criteria for 
determining Greek nationality, and the Ottoman Empire was divided into nations 
accordingly. 
By the mid-eighteenth century a nationalist movement was emerging, 
and its first stirrings were a cultural revival. The church itself increasingly came 
under criticism because of its corruption and open collaboration with the Turks. 
The resultant secularization opened Greece up to new ideas, and the Greeks 
begain relearning, to their surprise, that their own history (neglected in Greece 
because of the church's policy), was considered the touchstone of Western 
civilization. By the time of the late-eighteenth-century revolutionary ferment 
throughout Europe, Greece was ready to consider seriously the possibility of 
revolt. 
4. VVarforlndependence 
Transforming the semiments and normative ideas of nationalism into 
the institutional reality of a state required, as in the case of other revolutionary 
movements of an ethnocentric character, something more than the expression 
of agitational ideas and feelings by highly visible members of various unorga-
nized elites. It called for revolutionary organization, revolutionary deeds, and 
the creation of an embryonic governmental apparatus. In Greece, the period 
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of 1814-1830 witnessed the emergence of these three types of organized 
activities. 28 
Five constitutions, enacted from 1822 through 1833 were not only 
living symbols of the aspirations of the yivor to become an tBvor; they also 
served as a framework for the government of a nation in revolt. One of them 
included the basic juridicopolitical concept of nationalism that sovereignty 
resides in the people. 27 The identical preambles of the first two provisional 
Greek constitutions were the equivalent of declarations of independence. They 
sought to justify the "national struggle" in terms of natural rights as well as in 
those of a conflict between Christians and Muslims. 
The Greek Nation ..• declares today ... its political existence and indepen-
dence. 
Our war against the Turks, far from being based on demagogic and 
rebellious principles or on any selfish interests of a part only of the entire 
Hellenic Nation, is a national war, a sacred war, the only mot!\fe of which 
is the recovery of our rights of personal freedom, of property, and of hon-
or ••• 
Motivated by such principles of natural rights and desirous of becoming 
similar to the rest of our Christian brothers, we have started a war against 
the Turks •.. having decided to succeed in our purpose and to rule ourselves 
with just laws or to be wholly lost. 28 
28Stephen G. Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers, 1944-1947 (Thessalon-
iki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963), p. 75. 
27G. K. Aspreas, The Political History of Modern Greece, 1821-1928 
(Athens: Sideris Publishers, 1930), p. 63. 
28A. Mamoukas, Matters Pertaining to the Rebirth of Greece (Athens: 
1852), p. 201. 
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During the Greek War of Independence, the nationalist spirit was expressed 
mainly in deeds, not words. An there was a fundamental difference between those 
who wanted to pursue the war using the traditional klephtic methods of guerrilla 
warfare while relying on religious fervor as the motivating force and those who 
preferred the European model and were motivated by a conscious nationalism. 
Frustrated by insufficient territorial gains and unsatisfactory border agreements, even 
with the assistance of the European Powers (or, perhaps, because of this assistance) 
the stage was set for the integration of territorial acquisition as an official part of 
Greek foreign policy. 
5. The Great Idea 
From 1830, when emergent Greek nationalism attained its first objective, the 
setting up of a state in territory freed from Ottoman rule, until almost a century later, 
Greek nationalism in a new irredentist, expansionist, state-based guise was 
symbolized in the Mry6A17 16ta (the Great Idea). The first U.S. Minister to Athens, 
Charles K. Tuckerman, described it as follows: 
•.• The Great Idea means that the Greek mind is to regenerate the East--that it 
is the destinv of Hellenism to Hellenize that vast stretch of territory which by 
natural lavv the Greeks believe to be theirs, and which is chiefly inhabited by 
people claiming to be descended from Hellenic stock, professing the Orthodox 
or Greek faith, or speaking the Greek language. 29 
21C. K. Tuckerman, The Greeks of Today (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1878), 
p. 120. . 
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This exalted notion of pan-Hellenism, the Greek equivalent of "Manifest 
Destiny, • of "the white man's burden," or of the "Third Rome" found its expression 
in the writings of historians and educators of the time and was incorporated into the 
popular Greek notion of the role of the Greek nation-state in civilized society. 
Throughout the hundred-odd years of its life, the nationalist spirit of the Great 
Idea naturally underwent several changes in response to the course of the Eastern 
Question and developments in Balkan history. At the time of the Crimean War it 
assumed an interesting noncommittal character. At that time, some Greeks saw 
themselves as belonging neither to the West nor to the East, but participating with 
both. It was observed In the mid-1800's that, • A Greek feels equally at home in Paris 
and in Moscow ••• The Greek will never cease being Orthodox and considering Russia 
as his brother, [yet] the Greek ••• will never cease being a friend of freedom and of the 
science of the West and will look to the West ••• with admiration and love. 830 
8. Interwar Greek Nationalism 
The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 not only delimited the political boundaries 
of modem Greece along lines still holding good today except for the addition of the 
Dodecanese by the Italian Peace Treaty of 194 7, but removed from the Great Idea 
most of its solid irredentist core. The ethnic homogeneity of both Greece and 
neighboring Turkey were greatly increased by the exchange of populations of those 
nations, constituting the basis for the development of new manifestations of 
30
"The Greek Society," Le Spectateur d'Orient, volume I ( 1853), pp. 36-37. 
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nationalism, nationalist pride and nationalist aspirations. The most remarkable feature 
of the new spirit of Greek nationalism in the interwar period, however, was a 
conscious (though unsuccessful) effort to close the long chapter of Greek-Turkish 
hostility. The Young Turks, in fact, had "wondered whether the Greek element in the 
Ottoman Empire might not eventually come to exercise a condominium with the Turks 
in a great Anatolian empire • .s, 
During the 1930's, the term f/'uAq, "race," tends to be stressed. It was 
believed by members of the intelligentsia that the purpose of education in Greece, 
especially of primary education, should be to educate not human beings, but Greeks. 
loannes Metaxas wrote in 1935 (before his dictatorial reign): 
Let us not delude ourselves. "Men• exist only zoologically. Psychically, 
however, they are "Greeks," "French," "British," "Germans," "Bulgars," etc. 
Each man sees life, thinks, and acts as a function of his nationality, his race. 
Raciality is a physiological phenomenon. Greek youth must understand this in 
order to find its way. 12 
7. After World War II 
World War II and its immediate aftermath brought not only material disasters 
but also new elements of national pride and new national symbols. This period of 
schizoid nationalism reflected the pattern of international politics in a bipolar world and 
the conflicts that are still occurring as developments in eastern Europe on both sides 
11
"Who Killed the Megali Idea 1," Greek Themes, volume XM, number 5 (May 
1966), p. 281. 
32The Persons/ Diary of losnnls Metsxss (Athens: lkaros Publishers, 1960), 
p. 611. 
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of what used to be called the Iron Curtain suggest. The internal and external debates 
over the peace settlement after the second World War testified to the strong flare-up 
of externally directed nationalism that, soma of Greece's Western friends felt, was 
detrimental to the urgent national goals of rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
The militantly pro-western political world that finally prevailed in Greece, after 
the struggle from 1946 to 1949 to suppress the Communist-led rebellion, left its 
imprint on the Greek Constitution which was promulgated on 01 January 1952. For 
instance, the new constitution dispensed with the provisions of the 1927 constitution 
requiring specification of the circumstances under which public meetings could be 
banned (article 1 0), placed several new restrictions on freedom of the press (article 
16), and added "internal danger" to the contingencies when a "state of siege" could 
be declared, omitting an express provision of the 1927 document according to which 
the jurisdiction of miitary courts set up after the declaration of a "state of siege" 
should have no retroactive effect (article 91 ). 
Judged by the standards of Greek democracy at the time, the 1952 
constitution was a fairly liberal document. But, alongside it and in contradiction to 
its most basic principles, there existed a complete system of decrees, laws, and police 
regulations, both preventive and punitive, enacted during 1947-49. While these had 
been expressly limited "to the duration of this emergency," at the time of the 1952 
constitution the "emergency legislation" was confirmed and was maintained until 
2& 
1974 under the flctio juris of "the continuing aggression. "'3 Traditional values of 
nationalism were shaped and given new dignity in response to a bipolar world 
situation, stimulated by the Cold War and its attendant fear of communism. The 
values of the Greek heritage were now seen as part of the Greco-Roman-Judaic 
culture34 and Greek national pride tended to focus on these cultural values. 
C. TODAY'S GREEK NATIONAUSM 
The nationalism of today' s Greeks is nothing if not vehement. They have a 
poignant realization of their precarious position between the Balkans and Western 
Europe. More than one Greek official has echoed the concern that, "We are not 
looking out simply for Greek interests, but for the •• .interest of stability in the Balkans. 
[Among the NATO and EC nations] we are the country that loses everything if the 
situation disintegrates into a Lebanon. "31 The Greeks retain a broad uneasiness 
about their security and harbor serious concerns about being marginalized. 
International disputes which cut the Greeks off from their European partners aggravate 
nagging Greek fears that they may be viewed as more Balkan than West European. 
Still, Greece is a strong democracy in the troubled Balkan region, and it is striving to 
UVanis Yanoulopoulos, "Greece: Political and Constitutional Developments 
1924-1974, • John T. A. Koumoulides, Op. cit., pp. 81-2. 
M)(ydis, Greece and the Great Powers 1944-1947, p. 522. 
"Howard LaFranchi, "Greeks Unite in Opposition to Independent Macedo-
nia, • Christian Science Monitor (24 June 1992), p. 4. 
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enhance its position as a channel for democratic principles and economic develop-
ment. 
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Ill. THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES 
"Greece, as its Constitution requires, is determined to ensure equality of 
civic and legal rights for all the inhabitants of Thrace, Christians and Moslems 
alike. "31 These are the words of Konstantinos Mitsotakis, Greece's Prime 
Minister, spoken in northern Greece on 13 May 1991 . Aside from the literal 
significance of the statement itself, these words from the nation's leader 
indicate fairly clearly that minority concerns are drawn on religious lines. When 
a man calls himself Greek, very rarely is the "Orthodox" not implied. To be 
Greek is to be Orthodox--over 97% of Greece's population is associated with 
that faith. The president of the republic must be Orthodox, and is sworn in 
according to church rites. State holidays and ceremonies are synchronized with 
religious holidays. The day that the Greeks refused to capitulate to Benito 
Mussolini in 1940 is classified in a catechism book as a religious holiday. 37 
While Mr. Mitsotakis, in the speech quoted above, does go on to define 
the Moslem minority as consisting of three distinct ethnic groups--Turks, 
Pomacs and Gypsies--their ethnicity is clearly of secondary importance. It is an 
indiVidual's religious beliefs which the Greeks hold to be of prime importance 
31
"Prime Minister Mitsotakis Pledges Full Equality Under the Law for 
Greece's Moslem Minority" (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of Greece Press and 
Information Office, 1991 ), p. 1. 
37Rinn S. Shinn, Greece: A Country Study (Washington, DC: American 
University Foreign Area Studies, 1986), p. 109-111. 
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in defining loyalties. In fact, efforts to delineate ethnic differences within 
Greece are firmly resisted by the Greek government. Turkish accusations of 
minority mistreatment in Greece are regularly interpreted by the Greeks as 
attempts "to alter the religious nature of the Minority to that of an ethnic 
minority to be used as an instrument in the exercise of political racial strife 
within Greece. "38 
A. THE LAUSANNE SETTLEMENT 
While the possibilities of foreign entanglements in twentieth-century 
Greece were diminished by the elimination of the Great Idea as the primary 
official consideration in Greek politics (see Chapter IV), under the provisions of 
the Lausanne settlement of 1923, Greece lost to Turkey all that it had obtained 
by the defunct treaty of S6vres (the Smyrna enclave in Asia Minor, all of 
eastern Thrace, and the Aegean islands of lmbros and Tenedos). Arguably 
more important than the loss of territory was the agreement for a compulsory 
exchange of population, contained in a separate convention signed at Lausanne 
on 30 January 1923 by Greece and Turkey. The agreement called for the 
evacuation of all Turkish Muslims from Greece, exceptthose in western Thrace, 
and for the removal of all Greek Christians from Turkey, except those in 
31
"Recent Developments in Western Thrace and Some Observations on 
Documents and Statements Circulated by the Turkish Government" (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Embassy of Greece Press and Information Office, 1991 ), p. 9. 
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Constantinople (Istanbul), lmbros and Tenedos. The areas exempt from the 
exchange contained about 1 00,000 Turks and Greeks respectively. 
38 
The result of the convention was that Turkey received some 400,000 
Muslim refugees, while Greece absorbed about 1 ,300,000 Christians. With one 
stroke of the pen, the century-old drive of the Greeks for the city of Constanti-
nople and for the historic lands of Hellenism in Asia Minor were undermined. 
At the same time, the population exchange significantly increased the 
percentage of Greeks in Greek Macedonia and western Thrace, where most of 
the Greek refugees were settled. The Greek-Turkish exchange of minorities and 
an earlier Greek-Bulgarian population exchange of smaller proportions 
considerably improved the political security of Greece's northern provinces. 
The exchanges gave Greece llngustic and ethnic homogeneity, reducing its 
minorities to less than six percent of the total population of 5,820,000. 
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B. MINORmES WITHIN GREECE 
The highest goal the Greeks have ever hoped to attain with regard to 
minorities in Greece is "separate, but equal." The Greeks laud their own efforts 
at improving the level of the Moslem Teachers' Training College to equal that 
of the Teachers' Academies for the majority of Christian Greeks. "The 
31Harry J. Psomiades, The Eastern Question: The Last Phase. A Study in 
Greek-Turkish Diplomacy (Thessaloniki: 1968), pp. 1 05-1 08. 
40Couloumbis, Petropulos and Psomiades, op. cit., pp. 76-81 . 
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government," said Prime Minister Mitsotakis on 14 May 1991, "is determined 
to enable Moslem children ... to graduate from their high schools on their way 
to higher educational studies in colleges and universities (emphasis added). "41 
No mention is made of integrating Moslem and Orthodox children toward the 
goal of increased understanding or cultural enrichment. 
The Greek flvor, from which English derives its "xenophobia," means 
more to the Greeks thar· simply "foreigner." It also means, "strange," 
"somebody else's," and "not concerned with. "42 As applied to the fivor in 
Greece~ literal translation is revealing. To be other than Greek is to be less than 
Greek. 
As Greece is not eager even to acknowledge the existence of minorities 
within its borders, it is difficult to obtain accurate figures on the actual 
composition of ethnic minorities in Western Thrace. Since 1951, for instance, 
the Greek census has recorded neither mother tongue nor religious affiliation. 
Statements that Greece "today is inhabited exclusively by Greeks to a degree 
of national homogeneousness which is rare throughout the world"43 are 
rampant in Greek literature. Indeed, unbiased reports state that as little as two 
41
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percent of Greece's population of over ten million is not Greek--and notes that 
the Greek government recognizes no ethnic divisions within Greece. 44 
·roday, however, even the Greeks must admit that this is changing. 
Greece has for some time now been a place of refuge for those escaping from 
Albania--members of the Greek minority who have been welcome as well as a 
small number of ethnic Albanians who have not. What Greece fears now is 
!arge numbers of people of all nationalities escaping from collapsed Yugoslavia 
into Greeca if a civil war should continue to spread. 
C. THE GREEK DIASPORA 
The Greeks consider their diaspora to be spread across five continents. 
A Greek journal of international affairs reported that in 1991 : 
A rough estimate of the number of those living outside Greece and Cyprus 
would produce figures of at least two and a half million in North and 
South America, half a million in Western Europe, one hundred thousand 
or so in Africa, and close to a million in Australia ... [also included are] the 
few thousand Greeks still living in Turkey, the thousands of Greeks in 
sourthern Italy, the Greeks of the Black Sea coasts of Bulgaria and 
Romania ••• and the half-million or so Greeks of Albania. 46 
While Greeks may neither treat their minorities as equals nor afford them 
all the benefits of citizenship Orthodox Greeks enjoy, Greeks abroad are not 
typically welcomed with open arms, or even openly acknowledged, either. For 
44The World Factbook 1991 (Wa~: :ngton, D.C.: Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1991 ), pp. 117-118. 
"'•Expatriate Greeks Face a New Age," in Greek, Athena, number 41 
(Athens: International Studies Association, January 1991 ), p. 9. 
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years, Albanian President Enver Hoxha maintained that Albania had less than 
59,000 Greeks, but a Central Intelligence Agency report in 1991 put the figure 
at nearly 270,000, or 8% of Albania's population of about 3.6 million48--still 
short of the Greek claim to 500,000. The Albanian government refuses to 
allow Greek schools to be opened except where its skewed census figures 
show the population to be more than 50% Greek, and even then the schools 
can go only up to fourth grade. The Frankfurt-based International Society for 
Human Rights alleges that the 15,000 to 25,000 Greeks living in Tirana enjoy 
no minority rights, 47 and, "on 17 February [19921 in lisbon, the European 
Community and its 12 member-states expressed their 'deep concern' over 
incidents involving the Greek minority in Albania. "48 
D. ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION 
Allegations of discrimination against ethnic minorities have played a 
smaller part in troubled Greek-Turkish relations than t"' larger questions of the 
Aegean and of Cyprus. But any general settlement will need to include the 
48Frederick Kempe, "Greek-Albanian Border Holds Latest Tensions in Balkan 
Powderkeg, n The Wall Street Journal (04 March 1993) I p. A3. 
'-
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number 54 (Athens: Institute of International Political and Strategic Studies, 
February 1992), p. 47. 
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removal not merely of discrimination but also of any suspicion of discrimination, 
if the minorities question is not to be material for future discord. 
The criterion of the minorities' identity, as previously mentioned, is 
basically religious. It is therefore technically inaccurate to call them "national 
minorities," though they are generally referred to as such. 
It is believed in Greece that the low minority statistics the government 
publishes speak for themselves. But one could point out that the increase in 
the number of Muslims in Thrace is considerably less than would be expected 
from the minority's high birth-rate, and that large numbers of Muslims have, in 
fact, either emigrated or gone underground. Such emigration is not necessarily 
or simply the result of discrimination, however. Other factors causing 
emigration have been hardships at the hands of both the Bulgarians and the 
Germans in World War II, and at the hands of Greek guerrillas during the Greek 
Civil War. 48 Emigration to Turkey could be a natural outcome of ethnic and 
religious affiliation, or of a belief that Turkish cities provide more opportunities 
than Greek cities for Turkish-speaking Muslims. 
Some difficulties of the Turkish minority in western Thrace arise principally 
from the land question. Though forming only about thirty-five percent of the 
population, the Turks, who live largely by agriculture, once held about sixty 
percent of the land in the are. The Greek authorities have reduced the latter 
41Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Dispute {London: The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 17. 
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figure to twenty percent, and this has inevitably produced social and economic 
problems. 
Chief among the measures used to achieve this reduction has been the 
grant of long-term loans at very low interest rates to Greek families who come 
to settle in the area from other parts of Greece. The loans have been used to 
acquire Turkish land at what, it should be emphasized, have been quite 
generous prices. Turkish land has also been requisitioned in some areas for 
defense purposes. In others, it has been compulsorily purchased for civil 
projects, such as the university colleges of Western Thrace. 
Two other practices alleged by the Turkish minority are said to involve 
linguistic discrimination. These, if true, would contravene Articles 37-46 of the 
Treaty of Lausanne, which guarantee Muslims the same civil and political rights 
as non-Muslims. 
The first allegation of discrimination against non-Greek-speakers is in the 
granting of driving licenses, which are very important for farmers dependent on 
tractors and farm vehicles. The second is alleged discrimination against 
Muslims seeking admission to universities, where the medium of instruction is 
Greek. 
While allegations of this nature must be thoroughly investigated before 
being taken seriously in the midst of an age-old typhoon of propaganda, there 
are several commonly-cited examples of prejudice which are interesting to note. 
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For instance, in propaganda disseminated and marked "CONFIDENTIAL" by the 
Greek embassy in Washington, DC, it is reported that: 
In March 16, 1964, the Turkish government denounces the Greco-Turkish 
Agreement of Establishment etc., of October 30, 1930, on the ground 
that it no longer corresponds to circumstances ..• Turkish authorities started 
at once to expel Greek nationals on the ground that they were dangerous 
to the "internal and external" security of the state. Over a thousand 
Greeks were thus immediately expelled on the basis of lists that ... included 
6 deceased, 148 persons already established in Greece, 130 over 70 
years old, 20 over 80 years old, 4 mental cases, 8 persons partly 
paralyzed by stroke, 8 hospitalized persons, 3 blind and 2 deaf and 
dumb.60 
Also of note is the creative semantics of the above cited sources' assertion that 
when Turkish "libraries are not allowed to contain Greek books, including 
textbooks, encyclopedias and dictionaries .•• The Greek Government takes 
countermeasures in Western Thrace. "11 The nature of the "countermeasures" 
is not specified. 
10
"The Minority Question," manuscript distributed by the Embassy of 




IV. THE GREAT IDEA 
The heart of Greek nationalism began beating at the birth of the Greek 
state in the early nineteenth century. Over two million Greeks who, at the time 
of the state's creation, were living within Epirus, Thessaly, Macedonia, parts 
of Anatolia and on the islands surrounding Greece were considered irredentists, 
meaning, in Greek, "unredeemed." Incorporation of this diaspora, as well as 
the re-establishment of a Greek empire with Constantinople as its capital, 
became the keystone of Greece's foreign policy. This policy came to be known 
as ro MEY6Af1/6ta, or "the Great Idea." Contemplations of the Great Idea and 
its potentialities were a diversion from the acute and unresolved internal 
problems of the fledgling state, and lent the Greeks a feeling of "manifest 
destiny" which was to become an integral part of the national Greek character 
from the very inception of the Greek state until the early 1920's. 
A. BASIS 
A discussion of the foreign policy of Greece during its first century of 
independent statehood should begin with examination of what were and were 
not Greece's primary goals. Since the Greek state was guaranteed by three 
major European powers in an international treaty, it may safely be presumed 
that the territorial integrity of Greece was not in question. The moment of 
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exception to this assumption proved the rule by demonstrating that a military 
victor over the Greeks would be deprived of its territorial spoils by the European 
Great Powers. 
Underlying Greek foreign policy, however, were ostensibly purely domestic 
concerns, such as budget balancing and political stability. In fact, the Greek 
state often arranged its relations with the foreign powers in such a way as to 
meet these two basic problems. The absence of territorial integrity as a main 
concern of Greek foreign policy and the integral role played by interests which 
are conventionally considered domestic both indicate the importance of the 
international factor in the life of independent Greece. 52 
Had the Greeks been willing to remain a small state confined to the 
territory acquired at independence, Greece would undoubtedly have avoided 
much of the foreign interference it experienced. But the new state comprised 
only a minority of the Greek nation. The Great Idea, older than the Greek state 
itself, pressed the state to which it gave birth into its service. It demanded 
liberation of Greeks still subject to the Ottoman Empire or living under British 
colonial rule. As it involved their incorporation into a greater Greece, it 
presupposed territorial aggrandizement. 
12-fheodore A. Couloumbis, John A. Petropulos and Harry J. Psomiades, 
Foreign Interference In Greek Politics \New York: Pella Publishing Company, 
1978), pp. 21-27. 
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The basic problem was that the Great Idea made demands far exceeding 
the resources and capacities of the Greek state. Greece, unaided, was no 
match for the Ottoman Turks. The Idea also interfered with the nationalist 
aspirations of other concurrently emerging Balkan states who coveted some of 
the same territory claimed by the Greeks. Even worse, it disturbed the major 
European powers. All feared that the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire would 
upset the European balance of power and possibly provoke a European war. 
Though positions taken by Greeks on this issue covered a wide spectrUm, 
there were basically two poles, the moderate and the radical. The moderates 
advocated postponement of all military solutions until conditions proved 
favorable both domestically and internationally. This entailed internal 
development and the creation of a modem economic and administrative 
structure, as well as support from one or more powers and acquiescence of the 
rest. Until such a moment occurred, the most the moderates would advocate 
was an attempt to acquire limited territorial gains through the diplomatic action 
of the powers. The Great Idea became for them a distant goal. 
The radicals were advocates of a military approach. They argued that 
Greek internal development could never go beyond the marginal without 
territorial expansion, and that the international situation was subject to 
manipulation. Unlike the moderates, they believed that time was against 
Greece. Due to the Ottoman reform movement and the international support 
it was receiving, the Ottoman Empire, they believed, was getting stronger. The 
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creation of other independent Balkan states and their progressive expansion 
threated to rob the Greeks of coveted provinces. Direct action seemed urgent. 
Though internal factors were operative in supporting each of the above 
positions, the issue of territorial expansion was generally brought to a head by 
conditions and events outside Greece. 
B. HISTORICAL CLAIMS 
In 1853, following the visit of the Russian Prince Menshikov to Constanti-
nople to demand a Russian protectorate of the Orthodox Christians in the 
Ottoman Empire, the Greek leadership believed that the hour for Greek 
expansion had arrived and they prepared to invade Thessaly. Without fully 
considering the web of European politics following the outbreak of the Crimean 
War in March 1854, Greece invaded Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia, while the 
protecting powers were involved in war, with France and England pitted against 
Russia. This brought upon the Greek leadership the wrath of the Allies, France 
and Great Britain, and the Greek people began comparing themselves 
unfavorably to the Italians, who had enjoyed the support of France and Great 
Britain in their risorgimento movement for unification. 
The accession of King George 1 to the throne in the mid-1800's marked 
a new t~ra in foreign relations and in domestic affairs. The constitution of 1864 
was a great advance on its predecessor, and important changes occurred in the 
political scene. It was believed that the era of intrigues by the protecting 
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powers was over, and that the necessity for the Great Idea had come to an 
end. Throughout King George's half-century reign, the four principal parties in 
Greece differed on trivial domestic matters, but had no visions of reforms or 
causes. They all subscribed to the Great Idea, but quarrelled over the means 
to achieve it. These parties, however, left it to the King to face the rebukes of 
foreign envoys and, though his support for the Great Idea was well known, 
denounced him for ignoring the interests of the kingdom. 53 
The period of 1909 to 1913, especially the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, 
represented a landmark in modern Greek history. By 1913, through collective 
military action with its Balkan neighbors (Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro), 
Greece acquired the major part of Macedonia, southern Epirus, numerous 
Aegean islands, and the long-sought prize of Crete. For the first time since 
independence, Greece had expanded territorially as a result of its own efforts 
rather than through the good graces of the powers, rendering Greece a state 
important enough to figure positively in the calculations of the major powers. 
These sudden territorial gains, however, posed serious problems, one of 
which had to be faced for the first time in modern Greek history. It was the 
defense of territorial integrity. Greece now found itself thG object of counter-
irredentist claims. It faced the threatening prospect that any further ventures 
13Douglas Dakin, "The Formation of the Greek State: Political Developments 
Until1923," John T. A. Koumoulides, ed., Greece in Transition (London: Zeno 
Booksellers & Publishers, 1977), pp. 44-49. 
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toward realizing the Great Idea would expose Greece to the loss of territory 
already acquired. The newly won territory was large, not easily defensible, and 
in need of organization as an integral part of the nation. 
By the election of 14 November 1920, the defeat of the pro-expansionist 
government did not mean that half or more of the Greek people had renounced 
the Great Idea, it meant that those who for so long had been left in the cold 
were determined to profit from its realization. 54 Unlike later twentieth century 
bids for political office, fundamental disputes on foreign policy had no place in 
these election campaigns. 
World War I and the international complications to which it gave rise had 
lasting results for Greece. One was the revocation, by the Treaty of Lausanne, 
of the special guarantee which Britain, France and Russia had enjoyed since 
1832 and used as a justification of intervention in Greek affairs during the war. 
Its removal meant that Greece would be responsible for its own defense, and 
ensured that the powers would no longer be able to use such a legal device as 
a pretext for interference. 
This marked the official end of the Great Idea as the chief operative goal 
of Greek foreign policy. Greece found itself in the position of having to 
reconcile itself to a permanent status as a small state. In return, however, it 
liberated itself from a commitment whose implementation had occasioned 
"'Dakin, op. cit., p. 60. 
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foreign interference, caused internal dissension, and heavily overtaxed its 
scarce resources. It no longer depended on international developments to 
rectify the disparity between the resources required to fulfill the goals of the 
Great Idea and the available resources of the state. It appeared that, as a 
consequence of the Lausanne Treaty and the exchange of minorities (see 
chapter three), the ethnological limits of the Greek people largely coincided, at 
last, with the territorial limits of the Greek state. The security of that state, 
rather than the liberation of the "unredeemed" part of it, became the major 
objective of official Greek foreign policy. Greece seemed to have no choice but 
to turn its attention toward internal development. Its sole obligation as a state 
was toward its citizens, swollen as they were in number by the sudden massive 
influx of largely destitute refugees. It appeared that the Great Idea was to be 
merely a vague notion of bygone days. Or was it? 
C. A NEW "GREAT IDEA?" 
The Great Idea which was the outgrowth of Greece's independence from 
the Turks pulled the Greeks eastward, in an attempt to recapture the glory, and 
some of the lands, that had been Byzantium. In the past decade an alternative 
Idea has pulled them westward, as they have tried to dissolve themselves into 
the European Community. The end of the Cold War has given the Greeks a 
new foreign-policy option to the north. 
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For Greece, one of the most tangible results of the Cold War was an 
intangible--a political wall, erected between the Greeks and their once-familiar 
territory to the north. Now that the barrier has fallen, the Greeks are free to 
resume business in the Balkans, and this is the most natural and easily-
accepted, even if occasionally unwelcome, outcome of the end of the Cold 
War. 
Like the Swiss, [the Greeks] combine a strong sense of national identity 
with a cheerful willingness to live and work outside the homeland. Like 
the Jews, they are exactly the sort of quick-decision, risk-accepting 
businessmen who are needed when a region is changing from communism 
to capitalism. The Balkans are the Greeks' natural new hinterland: or, 
rather, their rediscovered hinterland. 11 
Greece, of course, cannot make or break the Balkans all by itself. While 
the Greeks claim that, "In the Balkans, where flux and instability have become 
the order of the day, Greece appears to be the only country which still has 
anything approaching a policy, "18 may be an exaggeration, Greece's potential 
to effect change should not be underestimated. There is still a small population 
of Greeks in Romania and Bulgaria, and Greece shares its Orthodox heritage 
with most of its northern neighbors. Northern Greece's Thessaloniki is a good 
11
" A New Great Idea, • The Economist, volume 327, number 7812 (22 May 
1993), pp. 13. 
58
" Greek Foreign Policy Towards Current Events," in Greek, Athena, number 
50 (Athens: Institute of International Political and Strategic Studies, October 
1991), p. 297. 
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place for foreign capitalists to build factories which will sell their goods to and 
seek employees from the revived Balkans. 
These changes and this reopening of a frontier is likely to change 
fundamentally how Greece interacts with the rest of Europe. Previously, 
Greece viewed its membership in the EC as the path away from isolation and 
as a generous source of cash. Until now, the Greeks have been among the 
most vocal advocates of a unified Europe, ready to move swiftly to a single 
foreign policy and a single army, but it is doubtful that the Greeks endorsing 
this move have fully considered its implications. It is difficult to imagine the 
Greeks letting basic decisions about their future be taken by a mainly non-Greek 
European organization. It is nearly laughable to imagine the Greeks leaving the 
defense of their border with Turkey to decisions taken in a distant European 
capital, and to a garrison in Thrace consisting mostly of soldiers from states 
other than Greece. 
Perhaps even more critical than these considerations, however, are the 
ramifications of a latent "Great Idea" which simmers just below the surface of 
Greek foreign policy. A Greek Naval officer, speaking about the most recent 
Macedonian crisis in June 1993, stated that, "We tried to do it legally, by 
appealing to the EC and UN. If that didn't work, then maybe we should just 
take the matter into our own hands and take back what was ours in the 
beginning. • There are others who feel similarly, such as the feminist university 
teacher and member of a small left-wing group who refers to H n6AIS' (•The 
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City," or Constantinople--today's Istanbul) with profound respect and with a 
real sense of loss. 57 
While this cannot be thought of as a majority opinion, it does have its 
adherents. Although the Great Idea may have died, it was never buried and 
thus lies ready to be ressurrected. The Greeks are not actively seeking a 
program of expansionism, but are not averse to taking advantage of propitious 
circumstances. Nor is Greek sentiment beyond an attachment to "preventive 
expansionism." Certainly, there will be no election platform based on 
"reacquisition n of territory I but the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement's (PASOK) 
campaign pledges with regard to Yugoslavia (which helped to earn for PASOK 
a Prime Minister's seat and a majority in the Parliament) to ensure that, " ..• we 
won't let them [the international community] cheat us again," indicate 
ominously that whether or not the government would resort to force of arms 
on its northern border, Greek leadership feels a need to respond to the mood 
of the Greek people--a mood which seems to include territorial "justice." 
This may become especially evident in regard to the modern-day 
Macedonian dilemma. While Greece has officially disavowed any territorial 
claims within the boundaries of the struggling republic, it has had to listen and 
watch while political figures within the Skopje-based republic have made 
grandiose claims. Ljupco Georgievski, for instance, the oddly-titled Vice-
17James Pettifer, The Greeks, p. 225. 
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President of the President of Macedonia, and leader of the VMRO-DPMNE, the 
strongest party in the Skopje parliament, claimed in a June 1991 speech that 
51 per cent of "Macedonia's" people lived in Greece and should join a united 
"Macedonian" state under his leadership. 58 Maps and travel brochures 
discussing Macedonia's "coastal areas" are readily available in Skopje and its 
environs. Even in the northern part of Greek Epirus, one may occasionally spot 
T-shirts with maps of the three rivers in the region--Egej (Albania), Vardar 
(Greece), and Pirin (Bulgaria)--emblazoned with the slogan, "OUR NEW 
COUNTRV."58 
Posters and placards and T-shirts and handbills all over Greece, from 
remote islands to the heart of Athens, proclaim with certainty that "Macedonia 
is Greece," and entreat the reader to "Read the Golden Pages of our History." 
Most often, these pronouncements are in English, but the statement that 
"Macedonia is Greece" is not simply the result of a sloppy translation in which 
the true meaning is that "Macedonia is Greek." Macedonia has come to 
embody the heart and soul of what is Greece, both in antiquity and today. 
From the greatest Greek of all in popular imagination, Alexander the Great, who 
51Pettifer, The Greeks, pp. 21 0-1. 
"The wearer of this T -shirt was travelling alone on a bus from loannina to 
Athens in October of 1993. While the shirt was printed in English, the wearer 
claimed he was unable to engage in conversation, or discuss where a similar 
shirt could be obtained, in either Greek or English. Upon disembarking, he 
asked directions of the bus driver, who, it turned out, understood only Greek. 
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ruled in Macedon, to notions of liguistic continuity and purity, the rise or fall of 
this Macedonian question is very closely and literally linked to the rise or fall of 
the Modern Greek state. The fall of ex-Prime Minister Mitsotakis' New 
Democracy government in the 1993 election is attributed, in part, to his early 
concessions on the Macedonian issue and to his dismissal of Foreign Minister 
Samaras, whose hard-line views (later adopted by Mitsotakis himself) irritated 
the international community. Yet, if the Skopje-based republic collapses, as is 
likely without substantial outside assistance, the political vacuum must be 
filled, and the Greeks can have no certainty that an expansionist Bulgaria, 
sensing an opportunity to gain territory as well as a sphere of influence, will not 
emerge. This could result in a Bulgarian push for a Greater Bulgaria which 
wouls include Thessaloniki and the long-sought opening to the Aegean, as well 
as an opportunity to transform its economic prospects and political standing. 
As these territories were won by the shedding of Greek blood against the Turks 
and then fought over just as bitterly in the last War, the Greeks are unlikely to 
grant the Bulgarians any room to maneuver further west along the northern 
Greek border, even if that means the Greeks, themselves, must fully occupy 
that territory. 
There are yet irredentist figures in Greece, such as Archbishop Sevastian-
os in Konitsa in Epirus, a supporter of the so-called Movement for the Recovery 
of Vorio Epirus (or Northern Epirus, the name many Greeks give to what is now 
Southern Albania). Archbishop Sevastianos is campaigning for the implementa-
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tion of the 1914 Protocol of Corfu, which gave northern Epirus to Greece when 
the Great Powers were trying to sort out the results of the Second Balkan War. 
About 200,000 Greeks still live in Albania and form the majority of the 
population in many southern areas. Although the 1914 decision was revoked 
by the Ambassadors' Conference of Paris in 1921, when the Powers felt the 
only way to end the anarchy in Albania was to set up a centralized state based 
on Tirana, many Greeks (not all of the extreme Right) believe in the justice of 
the return of these territories and their incorporation into Greece. Most often 
cited are numbers and ancient origins of the Greeks in Albania and use of the 
Greek language under Ali Pasha. This sort of talk gives Greece's Albanian 
neighbors at least some grounds for believing that, if civil war broke out in 
Albania, Greece might be interested in the dismemberment of the Albanian 
state.10 
Thus, it appears that politically and emotionally, the ideals of To MEytiAfl 
16ta are still in place in Greece, and it would require only a catalyst and the 
inattention (or lack of concern) of the international community to make this 
Great Idea once again an officially-sanctioned element of foreign policy. 
Preventing this eventuality is certainly feasible--speaking to the Greek pride and 
sense of self-preservation on issues like Macedonia and various Aegean 
disputes goes a long way. And its latent existence is unlikely to affect 
10Christopher Cviic, Remaking the Balkans (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations Press, 1991), pp. 101-2. 
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Greece's ongoing membership in institutions of European security any more 
than it has to date. But, stopping its spread once it is again released with 
official sanction--just as in the other Balkan wars--may be nearly impossible. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND 1M PLICA TIONS 
E6w 6Ev Elva1 nai(E yEAaoE, EotiJ Elva! BaAKavla 
(This place is not for playing and laughing, this is the Balkans. --Theophilus) 
The future for Greece looks very difficult. The opportunities offered by 
European Community membership have not been fully exploited, and the Greek 
financial picture is less than ideal. On every side, as seen from Athens, there 
are problems. To the north is a rapidly spreading crisis in the Balkans, poor 
relations with Albania over illegal immigration and the Vorio Epirus question, 
and the conflict over Macedonia. To the east and north-east lie the always 
antagonistic interests of Turkey, and the unpredictable pattern of development 
of the ex-Communist states. Further south lies Cyprus, and the possibility of 
some future crisis on the troubled island which still has not seen a satisfactory 
conclusion to its central dilemma. From the west come questions of Greece's 
role in the New Europe with its single market and Maastricht commitments. 
The 1990's for Greece are likely to mean a rediscovery of itself as a 
Balkan country and a greater distancing from external influences, especially 
under the newly-elected socialist Prime Minister. Throughout his 1993 
campaign, as in . •;s previous campaigns, he compared Greece to the underde-
veloped third-world countries, claiming that Greece has more in common with 
them than with the Western states. This thinking is bound to exert a 
significant influence on Greece's interaction with the rest of the world. Will 
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tomorrow's Greek nation and state lead or follow? There are those who believe 
that the path is already clear. 
It may seem strange but in a real sense Greece is the regional super-
power. To be a Balkan, not a European country, in the sense of being 
part of a potential federal Europe, must be a likely destiny for Greece. In 
cultural terms, if this means the reaffirmation of many features of 
traditional Greek life at risk from an increasingly technocratic and 
conformist culture ••. it must be a welcome development.'1 
Greek political parties tend to be one-man bands, and PASOK is by no 
means an exception. At the very least, the Greens (PASOK's nickname, based 
on the symbolic green rising sun which appears on all PASOK propaganda) will 
change their colors with the retirement or passing of the elder statesman 
currently in office; at most the party could fold or metamorphose. Without a 
doubt, its line and character would change. If that happens within the next 
four years, though unlikely, attempts at predicting the course of Greek politics 
would be foolhardy. 
Certainly, the Greeks will not develop any love for the Turks. They have 
hated them for so long and with such an often-justified depth that the response 
is nearly Pavlovian. The common man is likely to say, when asked directly, 
that he hates neither the Turks nor Turkey, but will show quite different colors 
when asked about issues involving Turkey, such as Cyprus, minorities, even 
Macedonia. Turkey, it seems, has moved beyond the ancient enmities. When 
asked who is Turkey's most worrisome enemy in the fall of 1993, Turkish 
11Pettlfer, The Greeks, p. 237. 
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l. 
Naval cadets, who are in the process of being fed government propaganda and 
can be expected to spout the officially sanctioned line, most often respond, 
"the Arabs, • or even, "the Kurds." Turkey may posture and maneuver in ways 
which irritate Greece, but losing a fight at the cost of loss of pride would not 
devastate the Turks as it would the Greeks. The Greek rivalry, a Turk might 
explain, is a thing of the past. 
Not to the Greeks. Although it might be argued that the Turks have no 
reason, or at least a much less compelling reason, to carry the flame of hatred 
than do the Greeks, the point is not moot. The Greeks have simply internalized 
and institutionalized their malice, and their enemy has not. Which is the 
stronger force--that of logic, or that of passion 7 One can only hope, in this 
case, the question is never brought to a test. 
Importantly, the Greek people will support their government, regardless of 
how they slander their leaders in nightly taverna debates. After weeks of wild 
rallitts in the streets of Athens during the 1993 elections, the day after th '~ 
election saw a quiet sense of, "Now, we can get on with the business of 
making money instead of noise. • Those who had voted for New Democracy, 
by and large, threw up their hands and said, "Oh well, it doesn't really matter 
anyway, • as did the Delfian ex-schoolteacher, Eleni, and the Athens bus driver, 
Arts. The victors, such as Yiannis the cab driver on Chios, largely did the 
same, though with bigger smiles on their faces. 
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So, Mr. Papandreau has every reason to expect that his constituency 
would support him in any tentative or bold steps he takes toward expansion in 
the name of the Great Idea, of self-defense, or even of preventive aggression. 
The Greeks pride themselves on being clever and on being able to recognize as 
well as capitalize on an opportunity. If Albania becomes more of a problem, or 
Skopje evaporates, and the international community does not rally behind 
Greece as Greece feels it is the international community's responsibility to do, 
it is quite possible that Greece will feel the need to act on its as-yet latent 
nationalistic ideals. The Greeks would view this not as an aggressive move, 
but as a move made in justice or self-defense--toward the all-encompassing end 
of self-preservation. 
That self-preservation is the ultimate end to all a Greek does throughout 
his life. Included in the "self, .. in a very real way, are the family and close 
friends. There is no great attachment to the land, other than as a way to make 
money, thus it would be irrelevant to a Greek whether the source of his income 
was the land his ancestors won or the territory just taken from a neighbor. The 
large number of successful Greeks abroad, who often neglect to reinvest in the 
homeland the funds they have gained abroad, is evidence of this. 
But the family and the history are different matters. A piano tuner living 
in Monterey, California, who has never sean Greece and speaks only English, 
like his father and grandfather, considers himself just as Greek as the most 
central Athens inhabitant. And woe be to the sad individual who tries to take 
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food out of the mouths of a man's children. A Greek would readily give up all 
potential future pleasures (except, perhaps, smoking!) in order to ensure the 
safety and happiness of his progeny--a less prominent quality in other cultures. 
The twin sides of the Greek national and personal character have always 
co-existed: the western-looking rationalist side, which gave rise to philosophy 
and mathematics, and the mystical Eastern side, which gave birth to Orthodoxy 
and is not really sure whether a national identity based on Athens is, at heart, 
Greek. There is no reason to expect that this Janus-like quality will not be a 
facet of future policy. Until the Greeks feel "safe," there will always be a 
possibility of massive reversion to old habits. The Greeks have not felt safe 
since the days of Alexander. In today' s environment, no one feels safe. 
So, the Great Idea lives in the Greek subconscious. It is not perpetuated 
through malice o,r nationalistic ambition alone, however, but also through a 
consuming passion to keep alive the glory of ancient Greece, which the modern 
Greek jealously protects as his birthright. There, our world began--one can 
hardly expect those who calf themselves its inheritors to ignore their inheri-
tance, or to lack a feeling of responsibility for maintaining a national glory 
worthy of it. 
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Every great people believes, and one must believe if it intends to live long, 
that in it alone resides the salvation of the world; that it lives in order to 
stand at the head of the nations, ... to lead them in a concordant choir 
toward the final goal preordained for them. 82 
By this measure, and by many others, the Greeks are, indeed, a great 
people. 
12Feodor Dostoyevsky, The Diary of a Writer (New York: George Braziller, 
1954), p. 575. 
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